From 1609f0d08d9d902ba0368423b95ea39b3c7de155 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Ngairangbam Mili Date: Fri, 5 Jul 2024 08:19:46 +0000 Subject: [PATCH] UEFI secure boot updates are misleading (dsr8mr3, dsr8mr2+) Change-Id: I5498771777cec0ada275c2741758095f891182fb Signed-off-by: Ngairangbam Mili --- doc/source/security/kubernetes/overview-of-uefi-secure-boot.rst | 2 +- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-) diff --git a/doc/source/security/kubernetes/overview-of-uefi-secure-boot.rst b/doc/source/security/kubernetes/overview-of-uefi-secure-boot.rst index 91cc3501a..c2dcccf6b 100644 --- a/doc/source/security/kubernetes/overview-of-uefi-secure-boot.rst +++ b/doc/source/security/kubernetes/overview-of-uefi-secure-boot.rst @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ boot loader is signed with a cryptographic key authorized by a database contained in the firmware or a security device. |prod|'s implementation of Secure Boot also validates the signature of the -second-stage boot loader, the kernel, and kernel modules. +second-stage boot loader and the kernel. |prod|'s public key, for programming in the hardware's Secure Boot database, can be found in the |prod| ISO.