grub2/grub-efi: fix CVEs
Porting patches from grub2_2.06-3~deb11u1 to fix below CVEs: CVE-2021-3695 CVE-2021-3696 CVE-2021-3697 CVE-2022-28733 CVE-2022-28734 The source code of grub2_2.06-3~deb11u1 is from: https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian/20220807T030023Z/pool /main/g/grub2/grub2_2.06-3~deb11u1.debian.tar.xz The relationship between commits and CVEs is as below: (1)CVE-2021-3695 commit <video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap out-of-bounds write> (2)CVE-2021-3696 commit <video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff table items> (3)CVE-2021-3697 commit <video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer write> (4)CVE-2022-28733 commit <net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely> (5)CVE-2022-28734 commit <net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers> commit <net/http: Error out on headers with LF without CR> Test plan: - PASS: build grub2/grub-efi. - PASS: build-image and install and boot up on lab/qemu. - PASS: check that the "stx.N" version number is right for both bios(grub2 ver) and uefi(grub-efi ver) boot. Partial-Bug: #2034119 Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com> Change-Id: Ia27b1ee225f13e9c4ad08a0828f93ea37f8d3dfb
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@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
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From 157486f818ecbe26b7962f5795a8f48393ba5169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:51:35 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH 1/6] video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap
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out-of-bounds write
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A 16-bit greyscale PNG without alpha is processed in the following loop:
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for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
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i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
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{
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d1[R3] = d2[1];
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d1[G3] = d2[1];
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d1[B3] = d2[1];
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}
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The increment of d1 is wrong. d1 is incremented by 4 bytes per iteration,
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but there are only 3 bytes allocated for storage. This means that image
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data will overwrite somewhat-attacker-controlled parts of memory - 3 bytes
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out of every 4 following the end of the image.
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This has existed since greyscale support was added in 2013 in commit
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3ccf16dff98f (grub-core/video/readers/png.c: Support grayscale).
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Saving starfield.png as a 16-bit greyscale image without alpha in the gimp
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and attempting to load it causes grub-emu to crash - I don't think this code
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has ever worked.
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Delete all PNG greyscale support.
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Fixes: CVE-2021-3695
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 87 +++--------------------------------
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
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index 4827b9c..1e35eae 100644
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--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
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+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
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@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct grub_png_data
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unsigned image_width, image_height;
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int bpp, is_16bit;
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- int raw_bytes, is_gray, is_alpha, is_palette;
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+ int raw_bytes, is_alpha, is_palette;
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int row_bytes, color_bits;
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grub_uint8_t *image_data;
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@@ -284,13 +284,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
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data->bpp = 3;
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else
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{
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- data->is_gray = 1;
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- data->bpp = 1;
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
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+ "png: color type not supported");
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}
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if ((color_bits != 8) && (color_bits != 16)
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&& (color_bits != 4
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- || !(data->is_gray || data->is_palette)))
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+ || !data->is_palette))
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return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
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"png: bit depth must be 8 or 16");
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@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
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}
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#ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
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- if (data->is_16bit || data->is_gray || data->is_palette)
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+ if (data->is_16bit || data->is_palette)
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#endif
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{
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data->image_data = grub_calloc (data->image_height, data->row_bytes);
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@@ -863,27 +863,8 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
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int shift;
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int mask = (1 << data->color_bits) - 1;
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unsigned j;
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- if (data->is_gray)
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- {
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- /* Generic formula is
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- (0xff * i) / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)
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- but for allowed bit depth of 1, 2 and for it's
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- equivalent to
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- (0xff / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)) * i
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- Precompute the multipliers to avoid division.
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- */
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-
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- const grub_uint8_t multipliers[5] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0x55, 0x24, 0x11 };
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- for (i = 0; i < (1U << data->color_bits); i++)
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- {
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- grub_uint8_t col = multipliers[data->color_bits] * i;
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- palette[i][0] = col;
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- palette[i][1] = col;
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- palette[i][2] = col;
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- }
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- }
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- else
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- grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
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+
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+ grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
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d1c = d1;
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d2c = d2;
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for (j = 0; j < data->image_height; j++, d1c += data->image_width * 3,
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@@ -920,60 +901,6 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
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}
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return;
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}
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-
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- if (data->is_gray)
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- {
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- switch (data->bpp)
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- {
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- case 4:
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- /* 16-bit gray with alpha. */
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- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
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- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 4)
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- {
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- d1[R4] = d2[3];
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- d1[G4] = d2[3];
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- d1[B4] = d2[3];
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- d1[A4] = d2[1];
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- }
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- break;
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- case 2:
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- if (data->is_16bit)
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- /* 16-bit gray without alpha. */
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- {
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- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
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- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
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- {
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- d1[R3] = d2[1];
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- d1[G3] = d2[1];
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- d1[B3] = d2[1];
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- }
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- }
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- else
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- /* 8-bit gray with alpha. */
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- {
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- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
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- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
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- {
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- d1[R4] = d2[1];
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- d1[G4] = d2[1];
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- d1[B4] = d2[1];
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- d1[A4] = d2[0];
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- }
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- }
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- break;
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- /* 8-bit gray without alpha. */
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- case 1:
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- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
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- i++, d1 += 3, d2++)
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- {
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- d1[R3] = d2[0];
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- d1[G3] = d2[0];
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- d1[B3] = d2[0];
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- }
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- break;
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- }
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- return;
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- }
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{
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/* Only copy the upper 8 bit. */
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--
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2.17.1
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@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
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From b54f7505732ad5c6237a133c0a1cf00774f13508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 23:25:07 +1000
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Subject: [PATCH 2/6] video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff
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table items
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In fuzzing we observed crashes where a code would attempt to be inserted
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into a huffman table before the start, leading to a set of heap OOB reads
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and writes as table entries with negative indices were shifted around and
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the new code written in.
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Catch the case where we would underflow the array and bail.
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Fixes: CVE-2021-3696
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 7 +++++++
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1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
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diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
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index 1e35eae..0356f91 100644
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--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
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+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
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@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ grub_png_insert_huff_item (struct huff_table *ht, int code, int len)
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for (i = len; i < ht->max_length; i++)
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n += ht->maxval[i];
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+ if (n > ht->num_values)
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+ {
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+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
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+ "png: out of range inserting huffman table item");
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+ return;
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+ }
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+
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for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
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ht->values[ht->num_values - i] = ht->values[ht->num_values - i - 1];
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--
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2.17.1
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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
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From a10c2350a766f9b315735931a49499a7e2c77bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 16:32:43 +0800
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Subject: [PATCH 3/6] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer
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write
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Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in
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grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(),
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we have the following loop:
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for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
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data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
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We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1.
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On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow,
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be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so
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we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.:
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0x6180_0000_0480 to
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0x6181_0000_0498
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^
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~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from
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any object.
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On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer
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that won't crash but will overwrite random data.
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Catch the underflow and error out.
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Fixes: CVE-2021-3697
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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[lz: Adapt the patch for context changes]
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Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
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---
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grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++-
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
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index 0eeea0e..fdaef18 100644
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--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
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+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
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@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
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#include <grub/mm.h>
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#include <grub/misc.h>
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#include <grub/bufio.h>
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+#include <grub/safemath.h>
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GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
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@@ -643,6 +644,7 @@ static grub_err_t
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grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
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{
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unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1;
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+ unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride;
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int rst = data->dri;
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vb = 8 << data->log_vs;
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@@ -654,8 +656,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
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return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
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"jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
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+ if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) ||
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+ grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) ||
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+ grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride))
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
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+ "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions");
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+
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for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
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- data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
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+ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3)
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for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
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c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3)
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{
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--
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2.17.1
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From 5d2f1e350e39677938a70c17a163f1a9cde36a18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 19:41:21 +1100
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Subject: [PATCH 4/6] net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely
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This avoids an underflow and subsequent unpleasantness.
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Fixes: CVE-2022-28733
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/net/ip.c | 10 +++++++++-
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1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/net/ip.c b/grub-core/net/ip.c
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index ea5edf8..74e4e8b 100644
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--- a/grub-core/net/ip.c
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+++ b/grub-core/net/ip.c
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@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
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#include <grub/net/netbuff.h>
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#include <grub/mm.h>
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#include <grub/priority_queue.h>
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+#include <grub/safemath.h>
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#include <grub/time.h>
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struct iphdr {
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@@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb,
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{
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rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK)
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+ (nb->tail - nb->data));
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- rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
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+
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+ if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t),
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+ &rsm->total_len))
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+ {
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+ grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n");
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+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
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+ }
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+
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rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len);
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if (!rsm->asm_netbuff)
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{
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--
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2.17.1
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From f37943427c5bf16a0003d3049221da698006f6f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 18:17:03 +1100
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Subject: [PATCH 5/6] net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers
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GRUB has special code for handling an http header that is split
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across two packets.
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The code tracks the end of line by looking for a "\n" byte. The
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code for split headers has always advanced the pointer just past the
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end of the line, whereas the code that handles unsplit headers does
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not advance the pointer. This extra advance causes the length to be
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one greater, which breaks an assumption in parse_line(), leading to
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it writing a NUL byte one byte past the end of the buffer where we
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reconstruct the line from the two packets.
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It's conceivable that an attacker controlled set of packets could
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cause this to zero out the first byte of the "next" pointer of the
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grub_mm_region structure following the current_line buffer.
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Do not advance the pointer in the split header case.
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Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
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Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/net/http.c | 4 +---
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1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
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index b616cf4..a19b0a2 100644
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--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
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+++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
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@@ -190,9 +190,7 @@ http_receive (grub_net_tcp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)),
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int have_line = 1;
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char *t;
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ptr = grub_memchr (nb->data, '\n', nb->tail - nb->data);
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- if (ptr)
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- ptr++;
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- else
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+ if (ptr == NULL)
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{
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have_line = 0;
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ptr = (char *) nb->tail;
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--
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2.17.1
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|
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
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From c96929e9eea455b07e0c2e06bc401eea6bf2be11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
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Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 19:04:40 +1100
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Subject: [PATCH 6/6] net/http: Error out on headers with LF without CR
|
||||
|
||||
In a similar vein to the previous patch, parse_line() would write
|
||||
a NUL byte past the end of the buffer if there was an HTTP header
|
||||
with a LF rather than a CRLF.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC-2616 says:
|
||||
|
||||
Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words separated by LWS
|
||||
or special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted
|
||||
string to be used within a parameter value (as defined in section 3.6).
|
||||
|
||||
We don't support quoted sections or continuation lines, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
If we see an LF that's not part of a CRLF, bail out.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/net/http.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
index a19b0a2..1fa62b5 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ parse_line (grub_file_t file, http_data_t data, char *ptr, grub_size_t len)
|
||||
char *end = ptr + len;
|
||||
while (end > ptr && *(end - 1) == '\r')
|
||||
end--;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* LF without CR. */
|
||||
+ if (end == ptr + len)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ data->errmsg = grub_strdup (_("invalid HTTP header - LF without CR"));
|
||||
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
*end = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Trailing CRLF. */
|
||||
if (data->in_chunk_len == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -32,3 +32,9 @@
|
||||
0032-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
|
||||
0033-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
|
||||
0034-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
|
||||
0035-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch
|
||||
0036-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch
|
||||
0037-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch
|
||||
0038-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch
|
||||
0039-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch
|
||||
0040-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,171 @@
|
||||
From 157486f818ecbe26b7962f5795a8f48393ba5169 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 18:51:35 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] video/readers/png: Drop greyscale support to fix heap
|
||||
out-of-bounds write
|
||||
|
||||
A 16-bit greyscale PNG without alpha is processed in the following loop:
|
||||
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
|
||||
i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
|
||||
{
|
||||
d1[R3] = d2[1];
|
||||
d1[G3] = d2[1];
|
||||
d1[B3] = d2[1];
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
The increment of d1 is wrong. d1 is incremented by 4 bytes per iteration,
|
||||
but there are only 3 bytes allocated for storage. This means that image
|
||||
data will overwrite somewhat-attacker-controlled parts of memory - 3 bytes
|
||||
out of every 4 following the end of the image.
|
||||
|
||||
This has existed since greyscale support was added in 2013 in commit
|
||||
3ccf16dff98f (grub-core/video/readers/png.c: Support grayscale).
|
||||
|
||||
Saving starfield.png as a 16-bit greyscale image without alpha in the gimp
|
||||
and attempting to load it causes grub-emu to crash - I don't think this code
|
||||
has ever worked.
|
||||
|
||||
Delete all PNG greyscale support.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2021-3695
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 87 +++--------------------------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 80 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
|
||||
index 4827b9c..1e35eae 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
|
||||
@@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ struct grub_png_data
|
||||
|
||||
unsigned image_width, image_height;
|
||||
int bpp, is_16bit;
|
||||
- int raw_bytes, is_gray, is_alpha, is_palette;
|
||||
+ int raw_bytes, is_alpha, is_palette;
|
||||
int row_bytes, color_bits;
|
||||
grub_uint8_t *image_data;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -284,13 +284,13 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
|
||||
data->bpp = 3;
|
||||
else
|
||||
{
|
||||
- data->is_gray = 1;
|
||||
- data->bpp = 1;
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
|
||||
+ "png: color type not supported");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if ((color_bits != 8) && (color_bits != 16)
|
||||
&& (color_bits != 4
|
||||
- || !(data->is_gray || data->is_palette)))
|
||||
+ || !data->is_palette))
|
||||
return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
|
||||
"png: bit depth must be 8 or 16");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -319,7 +319,7 @@ grub_png_decode_image_header (struct grub_png_data *data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifndef GRUB_CPU_WORDS_BIGENDIAN
|
||||
- if (data->is_16bit || data->is_gray || data->is_palette)
|
||||
+ if (data->is_16bit || data->is_palette)
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
{
|
||||
data->image_data = grub_calloc (data->image_height, data->row_bytes);
|
||||
@@ -863,27 +863,8 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
|
||||
int shift;
|
||||
int mask = (1 << data->color_bits) - 1;
|
||||
unsigned j;
|
||||
- if (data->is_gray)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- /* Generic formula is
|
||||
- (0xff * i) / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)
|
||||
- but for allowed bit depth of 1, 2 and for it's
|
||||
- equivalent to
|
||||
- (0xff / ((1U << data->color_bits) - 1)) * i
|
||||
- Precompute the multipliers to avoid division.
|
||||
- */
|
||||
-
|
||||
- const grub_uint8_t multipliers[5] = { 0xff, 0xff, 0x55, 0x24, 0x11 };
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < (1U << data->color_bits); i++)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- grub_uint8_t col = multipliers[data->color_bits] * i;
|
||||
- palette[i][0] = col;
|
||||
- palette[i][1] = col;
|
||||
- palette[i][2] = col;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ grub_memcpy (palette, data->palette, 3 << data->color_bits);
|
||||
d1c = d1;
|
||||
d2c = d2;
|
||||
for (j = 0; j < data->image_height; j++, d1c += data->image_width * 3,
|
||||
@@ -920,60 +901,6 @@ grub_png_convert_image (struct grub_png_data *data)
|
||||
}
|
||||
return;
|
||||
}
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (data->is_gray)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- switch (data->bpp)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- case 4:
|
||||
- /* 16-bit gray with alpha. */
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
|
||||
- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 4)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- d1[R4] = d2[3];
|
||||
- d1[G4] = d2[3];
|
||||
- d1[B4] = d2[3];
|
||||
- d1[A4] = d2[1];
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- case 2:
|
||||
- if (data->is_16bit)
|
||||
- /* 16-bit gray without alpha. */
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
|
||||
- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- d1[R3] = d2[1];
|
||||
- d1[G3] = d2[1];
|
||||
- d1[B3] = d2[1];
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- /* 8-bit gray with alpha. */
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
|
||||
- i++, d1 += 4, d2 += 2)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- d1[R4] = d2[1];
|
||||
- d1[G4] = d2[1];
|
||||
- d1[B4] = d2[1];
|
||||
- d1[A4] = d2[0];
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- /* 8-bit gray without alpha. */
|
||||
- case 1:
|
||||
- for (i = 0; i < (data->image_width * data->image_height);
|
||||
- i++, d1 += 3, d2++)
|
||||
- {
|
||||
- d1[R3] = d2[0];
|
||||
- d1[G3] = d2[0];
|
||||
- d1[B3] = d2[0];
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- break;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- return;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
|
||||
{
|
||||
/* Only copy the upper 8 bit. */
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,42 @@
|
||||
From b54f7505732ad5c6237a133c0a1cf00774f13508 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 6 Jul 2021 23:25:07 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] video/readers/png: Avoid heap OOB R/W inserting huff
|
||||
table items
|
||||
|
||||
In fuzzing we observed crashes where a code would attempt to be inserted
|
||||
into a huffman table before the start, leading to a set of heap OOB reads
|
||||
and writes as table entries with negative indices were shifted around and
|
||||
the new code written in.
|
||||
|
||||
Catch the case where we would underflow the array and bail.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2021-3696
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/video/readers/png.c | 7 +++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
|
||||
index 1e35eae..0356f91 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/png.c
|
||||
@@ -420,6 +420,13 @@ grub_png_insert_huff_item (struct huff_table *ht, int code, int len)
|
||||
for (i = len; i < ht->max_length; i++)
|
||||
n += ht->maxval[i];
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (n > ht->num_values)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
|
||||
+ "png: out of range inserting huffman table item");
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < n; i++)
|
||||
ht->values[ht->num_values - i] = ht->values[ht->num_values - i - 1];
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
|
||||
From a10c2350a766f9b315735931a49499a7e2c77bf3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 16:32:43 +0800
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] video/readers/jpeg: Block int underflow -> wild pointer
|
||||
write
|
||||
|
||||
Certain 1 px wide images caused a wild pointer write in
|
||||
grub_jpeg_ycrcb_to_rgb(). This was caused because in grub_jpeg_decode_data(),
|
||||
we have the following loop:
|
||||
|
||||
for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
|
||||
data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
|
||||
|
||||
We did not check if vb * width >= hb * nc1.
|
||||
|
||||
On a 64-bit platform, if that turns out to be negative, it will underflow,
|
||||
be interpreted as unsigned 64-bit, then be added to the 64-bit pointer, so
|
||||
we see data->bitmap_ptr jump, e.g.:
|
||||
|
||||
0x6180_0000_0480 to
|
||||
0x6181_0000_0498
|
||||
^
|
||||
~--- carry has occurred and this pointer is now far away from
|
||||
any object.
|
||||
|
||||
On a 32-bit platform, it will decrement the pointer, creating a pointer
|
||||
that won't crash but will overwrite random data.
|
||||
|
||||
Catch the underflow and error out.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2021-3697
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
[lz: Adapt the patch for context changes]
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c | 10 +++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
|
||||
index 0eeea0e..fdaef18 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/video/readers/jpeg.c
|
||||
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
|
||||
#include <grub/mm.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/misc.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/bufio.h>
|
||||
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
|
||||
|
||||
GRUB_MOD_LICENSE ("GPLv3+");
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -643,6 +644,7 @@ static grub_err_t
|
||||
grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
|
||||
{
|
||||
unsigned c1, vb, hb, nr1, nc1;
|
||||
+ unsigned stride_a, stride_b, stride;
|
||||
int rst = data->dri;
|
||||
|
||||
vb = 8 << data->log_vs;
|
||||
@@ -654,8 +656,14 @@ grub_jpeg_decode_data (struct grub_jpeg_data *data)
|
||||
return grub_error(GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
|
||||
"jpeg: attempted to decode data before start of stream");
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (grub_mul(vb, data->image_width, &stride_a) ||
|
||||
+ grub_mul(hb, nc1, &stride_b) ||
|
||||
+ grub_sub(stride_a, stride_b, &stride))
|
||||
+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FILE_TYPE,
|
||||
+ "jpeg: cannot decode image with these dimensions");
|
||||
+
|
||||
for (; data->r1 < nr1 && (!data->dri || rst);
|
||||
- data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += (vb * data->image_width - hb * nc1) * 3)
|
||||
+ data->r1++, data->bitmap_ptr += stride * 3)
|
||||
for (c1 = 0; c1 < nc1 && (!data->dri || rst);
|
||||
c1++, rst--, data->bitmap_ptr += hb * 3)
|
||||
{
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
|
||||
From 5d2f1e350e39677938a70c17a163f1a9cde36a18 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 20 Dec 2021 19:41:21 +1100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] net/ip: Do IP fragment maths safely
|
||||
|
||||
This avoids an underflow and subsequent unpleasantness.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2022-28733
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/net/ip.c | 10 +++++++++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/net/ip.c b/grub-core/net/ip.c
|
||||
index ea5edf8..74e4e8b 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/net/ip.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/net/ip.c
|
||||
@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@
|
||||
#include <grub/net/netbuff.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/mm.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/priority_queue.h>
|
||||
+#include <grub/safemath.h>
|
||||
#include <grub/time.h>
|
||||
|
||||
struct iphdr {
|
||||
@@ -512,7 +513,14 @@ grub_net_recv_ip4_packets (struct grub_net_buff *nb,
|
||||
{
|
||||
rsm->total_len = (8 * (grub_be_to_cpu16 (iph->frags) & OFFSET_MASK)
|
||||
+ (nb->tail - nb->data));
|
||||
- rsm->total_len -= ((iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t));
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (grub_sub (rsm->total_len, (iph->verhdrlen & 0xf) * sizeof (grub_uint32_t),
|
||||
+ &rsm->total_len))
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ grub_dprintf ("net", "IP reassembly size underflow\n");
|
||||
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
rsm->asm_netbuff = grub_netbuff_alloc (rsm->total_len);
|
||||
if (!rsm->asm_netbuff)
|
||||
{
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,48 @@
|
||||
From f37943427c5bf16a0003d3049221da698006f6f3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 18:17:03 +1100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] net/http: Fix OOB write for split http headers
|
||||
|
||||
GRUB has special code for handling an http header that is split
|
||||
across two packets.
|
||||
|
||||
The code tracks the end of line by looking for a "\n" byte. The
|
||||
code for split headers has always advanced the pointer just past the
|
||||
end of the line, whereas the code that handles unsplit headers does
|
||||
not advance the pointer. This extra advance causes the length to be
|
||||
one greater, which breaks an assumption in parse_line(), leading to
|
||||
it writing a NUL byte one byte past the end of the buffer where we
|
||||
reconstruct the line from the two packets.
|
||||
|
||||
It's conceivable that an attacker controlled set of packets could
|
||||
cause this to zero out the first byte of the "next" pointer of the
|
||||
grub_mm_region structure following the current_line buffer.
|
||||
|
||||
Do not advance the pointer in the split header case.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/net/http.c | 4 +---
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
index b616cf4..a19b0a2 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
@@ -190,9 +190,7 @@ http_receive (grub_net_tcp_socket_t sock __attribute__ ((unused)),
|
||||
int have_line = 1;
|
||||
char *t;
|
||||
ptr = grub_memchr (nb->data, '\n', nb->tail - nb->data);
|
||||
- if (ptr)
|
||||
- ptr++;
|
||||
- else
|
||||
+ if (ptr == NULL)
|
||||
{
|
||||
have_line = 0;
|
||||
ptr = (char *) nb->tail;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -0,0 +1,50 @@
|
||||
From c96929e9eea455b07e0c2e06bc401eea6bf2be11 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 8 Mar 2022 19:04:40 +1100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] net/http: Error out on headers with LF without CR
|
||||
|
||||
In a similar vein to the previous patch, parse_line() would write
|
||||
a NUL byte past the end of the buffer if there was an HTTP header
|
||||
with a LF rather than a CRLF.
|
||||
|
||||
RFC-2616 says:
|
||||
|
||||
Many HTTP/1.1 header field values consist of words separated by LWS
|
||||
or special characters. These special characters MUST be in a quoted
|
||||
string to be used within a parameter value (as defined in section 3.6).
|
||||
|
||||
We don't support quoted sections or continuation lines, etc.
|
||||
|
||||
If we see an LF that's not part of a CRLF, bail out.
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes: CVE-2022-28734
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Daniel Axtens <dja@axtens.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
grub-core/net/http.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/grub-core/net/http.c b/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
index a19b0a2..1fa62b5 100644
|
||||
--- a/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
+++ b/grub-core/net/http.c
|
||||
@@ -68,7 +68,15 @@ parse_line (grub_file_t file, http_data_t data, char *ptr, grub_size_t len)
|
||||
char *end = ptr + len;
|
||||
while (end > ptr && *(end - 1) == '\r')
|
||||
end--;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* LF without CR. */
|
||||
+ if (end == ptr + len)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ data->errmsg = grub_strdup (_("invalid HTTP header - LF without CR"));
|
||||
+ return GRUB_ERR_NONE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
*end = 0;
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* Trailing CRLF. */
|
||||
if (data->in_chunk_len == 1)
|
||||
{
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.17.1
|
||||
|
@ -15,3 +15,9 @@
|
||||
0015-font-Harden-grub_font_blit_glyph-and-grub_font_blit_.patch
|
||||
0016-font-Assign-null_font-to-glyphs-in-ascii_font_glyph.patch
|
||||
0017-normal-charset-Fix-an-integer-overflow-in-grub_unico.patch
|
||||
0018-video-readers-png-Drop-greyscale-support-to-fix-heap.patch
|
||||
0019-video-readers-png-Avoid-heap-OOB-R-W-inserting-huff-.patch
|
||||
0020-video-readers-jpeg-Block-int-underflow-wild-pointer-.patch
|
||||
0021-net-ip-Do-IP-fragment-maths-safely.patch
|
||||
0022-net-http-Fix-OOB-write-for-split-http-headers.patch
|
||||
0023-net-http-Error-out-on-headers-with-LF-without-CR.patch
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user