grub2/grub-efi: fix CVE-2023-4692/CVE-2023-4693
Porting patches from grub2_2.06-3~deb11u6 to fix CVE-2023-4692/CVE-2023-4693. The source code of grub2_2.06-3~deb11u6 is from: https://snapshot.debian.org/archive/debian-security/20231006T185629Z/ pool/updates/main/g/grub2/grub2_2.06-3~deb11u6.debian.tar.xz Patch for CVE-2023-4692: <fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute for the $MFT file> Patch for CVE-2023-4693: <fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident $DATA attribute> No content changes for all the patches from debian release. We do this because grub2/grub-efi is ported from wrlinux for secure boot bringing up. Test plan: - PASS: build grub2/grub-efi. - PASS: build-image and install and boot up on lab/qemu. - PASS: check that the "stx.N" version number is right for both bios(grub2 ver) and uefi(grub-efi ver) boot. Closes-bug: 2038742 Signed-off-by: Li Zhou <li.zhou@windriver.com> Change-Id: I7c8e11952fb409be93e9d777bf7da7b87414a95d
This commit is contained in:
Li Zhou
parent
8bfa85ac23
commit
daea2d8219
@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
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From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
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Subject: fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute
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for the $MFT file
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When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
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using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
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containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
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which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
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These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
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offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
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the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
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However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
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the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
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causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
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values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
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Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
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assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
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This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
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written beyond the boundary.
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Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
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Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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index bbdbe24..c3c4db1 100644
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--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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}
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if (at->attr_end)
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{
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- grub_uint8_t *pa;
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+ grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
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at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
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if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
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@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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}
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at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
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at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
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+ pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
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}
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else
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{
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at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
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at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
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+ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
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}
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at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
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while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
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@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
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at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
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pa = at->attr_cur;
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+
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+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
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+ {
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+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
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grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
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grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
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@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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{
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if (*pa != attr)
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break;
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+
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+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
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+ {
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+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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if (read_attr
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(at, pa + 0x10,
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u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
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Subject: fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident $DATA
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attribute
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When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
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the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
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there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
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file record segment.
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When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
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read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
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arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
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This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
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contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
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obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
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This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
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corresponding file record segment only.
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Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
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Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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index c3c4db1..a68e173 100644
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--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
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{
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if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
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return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
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- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
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+
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+ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
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+
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+ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
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+
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+ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
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+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
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+
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+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
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return 0;
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}
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@ -24,6 +24,8 @@
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0041-loader-efi-chainloader-Simplify-the-loader-state.patch
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0041-loader-efi-chainloader-Simplify-the-loader-state.patch
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0042-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
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0042-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
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0043-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
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0043-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
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0044-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
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0045-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
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lat/0003-Make-UEFI-watchdog-behaviour-configurable.patch
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lat/0003-Make-UEFI-watchdog-behaviour-configurable.patch
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lat/0004-correct-grub_errno.patch
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lat/0004-correct-grub_errno.patch
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lat/0005-grub-verify-Add-skip_check_cfg-variable.patch
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lat/0005-grub-verify-Add-skip_check_cfg-variable.patch
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@ -0,0 +1,89 @@
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From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:31:57 +0300
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Subject: fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB write when parsing the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute
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for the $MFT file
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When parsing an extremely fragmented $MFT file, i.e., the file described
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using the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute, current NTFS code will reuse a buffer
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containing bytes read from the underlying drive to store sector numbers,
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which are consumed later to read data from these sectors into another buffer.
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These sectors numbers, two 32-bit integers, are always stored at predefined
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offsets, 0x10 and 0x14, relative to first byte of the selected entry within
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the $ATTRIBUTE_LIST attribute. Usually, this won't cause any problem.
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However, when parsing a specially-crafted file system image, this may cause
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the NTFS code to write these integers beyond the buffer boundary, likely
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causing the GRUB memory allocator to misbehave or fail. These integers contain
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values which are controlled by on-disk structures of the NTFS file system.
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Such modification and resulting misbehavior may touch a memory range not
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assigned to the GRUB and owned by firmware or another EFI application/driver.
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This fix introduces checks to ensure that these sector numbers are never
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written beyond the boundary.
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Fixes: CVE-2023-4692
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Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 18 +++++++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 17 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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index bbdbe24..c3c4db1 100644
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--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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@@ -184,7 +184,7 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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}
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if (at->attr_end)
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{
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- grub_uint8_t *pa;
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+ grub_uint8_t *pa, *pa_end;
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at->emft_buf = grub_malloc (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
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if (at->emft_buf == NULL)
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@@ -209,11 +209,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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}
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at->attr_nxt = at->edat_buf;
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at->attr_end = at->edat_buf + u32at (pa, 0x30);
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+ pa_end = at->edat_buf + n;
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}
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else
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{
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at->attr_nxt = at->attr_end + u16at (pa, 0x14);
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at->attr_end = at->attr_end + u32at (pa, 4);
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+ pa_end = at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR);
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}
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at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_ALST;
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while (at->attr_nxt < at->attr_end)
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@@ -230,6 +232,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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at->flags |= GRUB_NTFS_AF_GPOS;
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at->attr_cur = at->attr_nxt;
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pa = at->attr_cur;
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+
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+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
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+ {
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+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x10,
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grub_cpu_to_le32 (at->mft->data->mft_start));
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grub_set_unaligned32 ((char *) pa + 0x14,
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@@ -240,6 +249,13 @@ find_attr (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t attr)
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{
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if (*pa != attr)
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break;
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+
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+ if ((pa >= pa_end) || (pa_end - pa < 0x18))
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+ {
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+ grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "can\'t parse attribute list");
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+ return NULL;
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+ }
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+
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if (read_attr
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(at, pa + 0x10,
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u32at (pa, 0x10) * (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR),
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@ -0,0 +1,54 @@
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From: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Date: Mon, 28 Aug 2023 16:32:33 +0300
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Subject: fs/ntfs: Fix an OOB read when reading data from the resident $DATA
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attribute
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When reading a file containing resident data, i.e., the file data is stored in
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the $DATA attribute within the NTFS file record, not in external clusters,
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there are no checks that this resident data actually fits the corresponding
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file record segment.
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When parsing a specially-crafted file system image, the current NTFS code will
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read the file data from an arbitrary, attacker-chosen memory offset and of
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arbitrary, attacker-chosen length.
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This allows an attacker to display arbitrary chunks of memory, which could
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contain sensitive information like password hashes or even plain-text,
|
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obfuscated passwords from BS EFI variables.
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|
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This fix implements a check to ensure that resident data is read from the
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corresponding file record segment only.
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Fixes: CVE-2023-4693
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Reported-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Signed-off-by: Maxim Suhanov <dfirblog@gmail.com>
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Reviewed-by: Daniel Kiper <daniel.kiper@oracle.com>
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---
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grub-core/fs/ntfs.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
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1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
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diff --git a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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index c3c4db1..a68e173 100644
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--- a/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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+++ b/grub-core/fs/ntfs.c
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@@ -401,7 +401,18 @@ read_data (struct grub_ntfs_attr *at, grub_uint8_t *pa, grub_uint8_t *dest,
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{
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if (ofs + len > u32at (pa, 0x10))
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return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "read out of range");
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- grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u32at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
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+
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+ if (u32at (pa, 0x10) > (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute too large");
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+
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+ if (pa >= at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR))
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
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+
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+ if (u16at (pa, 0x14) + u32at (pa, 0x10) >
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+ (grub_addr_t) at->mft->buf + (at->mft->data->mft_size << GRUB_NTFS_BLK_SHR) - (grub_addr_t) pa)
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+ return grub_error (GRUB_ERR_BAD_FS, "resident attribute out of range");
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+
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+ grub_memcpy (dest, pa + u16at (pa, 0x14) + ofs, len);
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return 0;
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|
}
|
||||||
|
|
||||||
@ -24,3 +24,5 @@
|
|||||||
0024-loader-efi-chainloader-Simplify-the-loader-state.patch
|
0024-loader-efi-chainloader-Simplify-the-loader-state.patch
|
||||||
0025-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
|
0025-commands-boot-Add-API-to-pass-context-to-loader.patch
|
||||||
0026-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
|
0026-loader-efi-chainloader-Use-grub_loader_set_ex.patch
|
||||||
|
0027-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-write-when-parsing-the-ATTRIBUTE_.patch
|
||||||
|
0028-fs-ntfs-Fix-an-OOB-read-when-reading-data-from-the-r.patch
|
||||||
|
|||||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user