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Access Control Lists (ACLs)
Normally to create, read and modify containers and objects, you must have the appropriate roles on the project associated with the account, i.e., you must be the owner of the account. However, an owner can grant access to other users by using an Access Control List (ACL).
There are two types of ACLs:
container_acls
. These are specified on a container and apply to that container only and the objects in the container.account_acls
. These are specified at the account level and apply to all containers and objects in the account.
Container ACLs
Container ACLs are stored in the X-Container-Write
and
X-Container-Read
metadata. The scope of the ACL is limited
to the container where the metadata is set and the objects in the
container. In addition:
X-Container-Write
grants the ability to perform PUT, POST and DELETE operations on objects within a container. It does not grant the ability to perform POST or DELETE operations on the container itself. Some ACL elements also grant the ability to perform HEAD or GET operations on the container.X-Container-Read
grants the ability to perform GET and HEAD operations on objects within a container. Some of the ACL elements also grant the ability to perform HEAD or GET operations on the container itself. However, a container ACL does not allow access to privileged metadata (such asX-Container-Sync-Key
).
Container ACLs use the "V1" ACL syntax which is a comma separated string of elements as shown in the following example:
.r:*,.rlistings,7ec59e87c6584c348b563254aae4c221:*
Spaces may occur between elements as shown in the following example:
.r : *, .rlistings, 7ec59e87c6584c348b563254aae4c221:*
However, these spaces are removed from the value stored in the
X-Container-Write
and X-Container-Read
metadata. In addition, the .r:
string can be written as
.referrer:
, but is stored as .r:
.
While all auth systems use the same syntax, the meaning of some elements is different because of the different concepts used by different auth systems as explained in the following sections:
acl_common_elements
acl_keystone_elements
acl_tempauth_elements
Common ACL Elements
The following table describes elements of an ACL that are supported
by both Keystone auth and TempAuth. These elements should only be used
with X-Container-Read
(with the exception of
.rlistings
, an error will occur if used with
X-Container-Write
):
Element | Description |
---|---|
.r:* |
Any user has access to objects. No token is required in the request. |
.r:<referrer> |
The referrer is granted access to objects. The referrer is
identified by the |
.r:-<referrer> |
This syntax (with "-" prepended to the referrer) is supported.
However, it does not deny access if another element (e.g.,
|
.rlistings |
Any user can perform a HEAD or GET operation on the container
provided the user also has read access on objects (e.g., also has
|
Keystone Auth ACL Elements
The following table describes elements of an ACL that are supported
only by Keystone auth. Keystone auth also supports the elements
described in acl_common_elements
.
A token must be included in the request for any of these ACL elements to take effect.
Element | Description |
---|---|
<project-id>:<user-id> |
The specified user, provided a token scoped to the project is
included in the request, is granted access. Access to the container is
also granted when used in |
<project-id>:* |
Any user with a role in the specified Keystone project has
access. A token scoped to the project must be included in the request.
Access to the container is also granted when used in
|
*:<user-id> |
The specified user has access. A token for the user (scoped to
any project) must be included in the request. Access to the container is
also granted when used in |
*:* |
Any user has access. Access to the container is also granted when
used in |
<role_name> |
A user with the specified role name on the project
within which the container is stored is granted access. A user token
scoped to the project must be included in the request. Access to the
container is also granted when used in
|
Note
Keystone project (tenant) or user names (i.e.,
<project-name>:<user-name>
) must no longer be
used because with the introduction of domains in Keystone, names are not
globally unique. You should use user and project ids
instead.
For backwards compatibility, ACLs using names will be granted by
keystoneauth when it can be established that the grantee project, the
grantee user and the project being accessed are either not yet in a
domain (e.g. the X-Auth-Token
has been obtained via the
Keystone V2 API) or are all in the default domain to which legacy
accounts would have been migrated.
TempAuth ACL Elements
The following table describes elements of an ACL that are supported
only by TempAuth. TempAuth auth also supports the elements described in
acl_common_elements
.
Element | Description |
---|---|
<user-name> |
The named user is granted access. The wildcard ("*") character is not supported. A token from the user must be included in the request. |
Container ACL Examples
Container ACLs may be set by including X-Container-Write
and/or X-Container-Read
headers with a PUT or a POST
request to the container URL. The following examples use the
swift
command line client which support these headers being
set via its --write-acl
and --read-acl
options.
Example: Public Container
The following allows anybody to list objects in the www
container and download objects. The users do not need to include a token
in their request. This ACL is commonly referred to as making the
container "public". It is useful when used with staticweb
:
swift post www --read-acl ".r:*,.rlistings"
Example: Shared Writable Container
The following allows anybody to upload or download objects. However, to download an object, the exact name of the object must be known since users cannot list the objects in the container. The users must include a Keystone token in the upload request. However, it does not need to be scoped to the project associated with the container:
swift post www --read-acl ".r:*" --write-acl "*:*"
Example: Sharing a Container with Project Members
The following allows any member of the
77b8f82565f14814bece56e50c4c240f
project to upload and
download objects or to list the contents of the www
container. A token scoped to the
77b8f82565f14814bece56e50c4c240f
project must be included
in the request:
swift post www --read-acl "77b8f82565f14814bece56e50c4c240f:*" \
--write-acl "77b8f82565f14814bece56e50c4c240f:*"
Example: Sharing a Container with Users having a specified Role
The following allows any user that has been assigned the
my_read_access_role
on the project within which the
www
container is stored to download objects or to list the
contents of the www
container. A user token scoped to the
project must be included in the download or list request:
swift post www --read-acl "my_read_access_role"
Example: Allowing a Referrer Domain to Download Objects
The following allows any request from the example.com
domain to access an object in the container:
swift post www --read-acl ".r:.example.com"
However, the request from the user must contain the appropriate Referer header as shown in this example request:
curl -i $publicURL/www/document --head -H "Referer: http://www.example.com/index.html"
Note
The Referer header is included in requests by many browsers. However, since it is easy to create a request with any desired value in the Referer header, the referrer ACL has very weak security.
Example: Sharing a Container with Another User
Sharing a Container with another user requires the knowledge of few parameters regarding the users.
The sharing user must know:
- the
OpenStack user id
of the other user
The sharing user must communicate to the other user:
- the name of the shared container
- the
OS_STORAGE_URL
Usually the OS_STORAGE_URL
is not exposed directly to
the user because the swift client
by default automatically
construct the OS_STORAGE_URL
based on the User
credential.
We assume that in the current directory there are the two client
environment script for the two users sharing.openrc
and
other.openrc
.
The sharing.openrc
should be similar to the
following:
export OS_USERNAME=sharing
# WARNING: Save the password in clear text only for testing purposes
export OS_PASSWORD=password
export OS_TENANT_NAME=projectName
export OS_AUTH_URL=https://identityHost:portNumber/v2.0
# The following lines can be omitted
export OS_TENANT_ID=tenantIDString
export OS_REGION_NAME=regionName
export OS_CACERT=/path/to/cacertFile
The other.openrc
should be similar to the following:
export OS_USERNAME=other
# WARNING: Save the password in clear text only for testing purposes
export OS_PASSWORD=otherPassword
export OS_TENANT_NAME=otherProjectName
export OS_AUTH_URL=https://identityHost:portNumber/v2.0
# The following lines can be omitted
export OS_TENANT_ID=tenantIDString
export OS_REGION_NAME=regionName
export OS_CACERT=/path/to/cacertFile
For more information see using the OpenStack RC file
First we figure out the other user id:
. other.openrc
OUID="$(openstack user show --format json "${OS_USERNAME}" | jq -r .id)"
or alternatively:
. other.openrc
OUID="$(openstack token issue -f json | jq -r .user_id)"
Then we figure out the storage url of the sharing user:
sharing.openrc
SURL="$(swift auth | awk -F = '/OS_STORAGE_URL/ {print $2}')"
Running as the sharing user create a shared container named
shared
in read-only mode with the other user using the
proper acl:
sharing.openrc
swift post --read-acl "*:${OUID}" shared
Running as the sharing user create and upload a test file:
touch void
swift upload shared void
Running as the other user list the files in the shared
container:
other.openrc
swift --os-storage-url="${SURL}" list shared
Running as the other user download the shared
container
in the /tmp
directory:
cd /tmp
swift --os-storage-url="${SURL}" download shared
Account ACLs
Note
Account ACLs are not currently supported by Keystone auth
The X-Account-Access-Control
header is used to specify
account-level ACLs in a format specific to the auth system. These
headers are visible and settable only by account owners (those for whom
swift_owner
is true). Behavior of account ACLs is
auth-system-dependent. In the case of TempAuth, if an authenticated user
has membership in a group which is listed in the ACL, then the user is
allowed the access level of that ACL.
Account ACLs use the "V2" ACL syntax, which is a JSON dictionary with
keys named "admin", "read-write", and "read-only". (Note the case
sensitivity.) An example value for the
X-Account-Access-Control
header looks like this, where
a
, b
and c
are user names:
{"admin":["a","b"],"read-only":["c"]}
Keys may be absent (as shown in above example).
The recommended way to generate ACL strings is as follows:
from swift.common.middleware.acl import format_acl
acl_data = { 'admin': ['alice'], 'read-write': ['bob', 'carol'] }
acl_string = format_acl(version=2, acl_dict=acl_data)
Using the format_acl
method will ensure that JSON is encoded as
ASCII (using e.g. 'u1234' for Unicode). While it's permissible to
manually send curl
commands containing
X-Account-Access-Control
headers, you should exercise
caution when doing so, due to the potential for human error.
Within the JSON dictionary stored in
X-Account-Access-Control
, the keys have the following
meanings:
Access Level | Description |
---|---|
read-only |
These identities can read everything (except privileged headers) in the account. Specifically, a user with read-only account access can get a list of containers in the account, list the contents of any container, retrieve any object, and see the (non-privileged) headers of the account, any container, or any object. |
read-write |
These identities can read or write (or create) any container. A user with read-write account access can create new containers, set any unprivileged container headers, overwrite objects, delete containers, etc. A read-write user can NOT set account headers (or perform any PUT/POST/DELETE requests on the account). |
admin |
These identities have "swift_owner" privileges. A user with admin account access can do anything the account owner can, including setting account headers and any privileged headers -- and thus granting read-only, read-write, or admin access to other users. |
For more details, see swift.common.middleware.tempauth
. For details on the
ACL format, see swift.common.middleware.acl
.